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In this article, Professor Dolan maintains that UCC Article 5 fashions
a comprehensive remedy scheme for recurring damages claims in letter
of credit litigation. That scheme, he contends, is upset by the introduction
of most common law causes of action in Article 5 litigation. He
concludes, therefore, that courts should not entertain those common law
claims, which he sees as destructive of letter of credit law and of the

unique commercial nature of letters of credit. Using the economic loss
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doctrine and similar theories, he urges courts to dismiss actions brought
in addition to or in lieu of the remedies Article 5 crafts.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper makes three claims: first, that Article 5 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (hereafter "UCC") brings within its remedy section,
section 5-111, all contract, tort, and similar causes of action, when the
aggrieved party's claim arises out of one or more of the grievances
specified in that section' and in the breach of warranty section. 2 Second,
that claims against the beneficiary for "wrongful draws" are covered by
the warranty section, section 5-110, and are limited to breach of warranty
damages.3 Third, that Article 5 forbids application of most other causes
of action extrinsic to Article 5, even though the UCC announces that its
rules are supplemented by the common law, including the law, among
others, of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation. 4
These three claims rest on the economic loss doctrine, similar
theories, and the notion that supplementing UCC remedy provisions with
common law claims distorts the general scheme of the various UCC
Articles. For simplicity, this paper casts the economic loss doctrine as the
chief support for its conclusions.
Part II of this paper explains the causes of action that arise in the
letter of credit transaction and that Article 5 contemplates. Part III
discusses the economic loss doctrine in order to determine the
applicability of the policies it serves in applying the Article 5 remedy and
warranty sections. Part IV analyzes the unique nature of letters of credit,
the feature of these undertakings that plays a signal role in supporting
application of the doctrine in the litigation of these claims. The balance
of this paper analyzes the various claims arising out of breach of the
duties recognized by Article 5: beneficiary causes of action (Part V),
applicant causes of action (Part VI), and issuer and third party causes of
action (Part VII).

1. U.C.C. § 5-111 (2002). The four grievances specified in the remedies section are:
[I] beneficiary claims against issuers for wrongful dishonor; [2] applicant claims against
beneficiaries for wrongful draw; [3] applicant claims against issuers for wrongful honor;
and [4] claims against advisors or nominated persons other than confirmers for breach of
an Article 5 obligation. See also U.C.C. § 5-110 (2002). All UCC references are to the
official version of the Uniform Commercial Code. See The Official Text of the 1995
revision of Article 5, §§ 5-101 to 5-118, 2B Part II U.L.A. 136-188 (Master Ed. 2002).
2. U.C.C. § 5-110 (2002).

3. Id.
4. See U.C.C § 1-103(b) (2002).
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II. THE ARTICLE 5 CAUSES OF ACTION

The thesis of this paper applies to all letter of credit transactions,
simple three-party transactions, multi-party transactions, standby letter of
credit transactions, and commercial letter of credit transactions. Because
it involves all of the parties, and especially the correspondent bank, the
prototypical commercial letter of credit transaction illustrated in the
footnote,5 serves this paper's discussion best.
In the commercial letter of credit transaction, the buyer of goods
applies to its bank to open a letter of credit. 6 The buyer's bank usually
issues the credit electronically through SWIFT' to its foreign
correspondent. 8 The correspondent plays a number of roles. It can simply
advise the credit, that is, communicate the terms of the credit to the
beneficiary. 9 It might also confirm the credit. By its confirmation, the
5. JOHN F. DOLAN, COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND TRANSACTIONS
(2d. ed. Supp. 1997) [hereinafter DOLAN, TERMS AND TRANSACTIONS].
Beneficiary

advice

international
sales
contract

Buyer
pBuyer
Applicant

I

complying $$
documents
mdocuments

Nominated
Bank

§ 5.2

application

ocuments

Issuer

SWIFT message-

6. The "application" in the illustration is an agreement that governs the relationship
between the bank's customer and the bank. Importantly, as further discussion explains,
the agreement is a contract, generally subject to contract law remedy rules, but with
damages limited under the thesis of this paper. Other relationships in the letter of credit
transaction are arguably not contracts but "idiosyncratic form[s] of undertaking." U.C.C.
§ 5-101 cmt. 1 (2002).
7. SWIFT is the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. See
SWIFT, www.swift.com (last visited July 30, 2012).
8. In domestic credit transactions, involving a standby credit, there is, usually, no
correspondent. See generally John F. Dolan, Changing Commercial Practices and the
Unform Commercial Code, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 579, 590 (1993).
9. The advisor's duties are minimal. See U.C.C. § 5-107(c) (2002), and discussion
infra notes 119, 123, 124, 128. Cf INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS
AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (I.C.C. Pub. No. 600) art. 9(b) (2006)

[hereinafter "U.C.P. 600"] (describing the advisor's duties).
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correspondent makes the same undertaking that the issuer makes and is
liable as an issuer is liable. o
Finally, the correspondent might play one of four roles in honoring
the letter of credit, the roles of a nominated bank. In these transactions,
the issuer nominates the correspondent (1) to pay the beneficiary's draft"
or to pay the beneficiary's demand for payment;12 (2) to accept' 3 the
beneficiary's time draft,14 thereby creating a banker's acceptance; (3) to
incur a deferred payment obligation similar to a banker's acceptance but
without any negotiable draft; or (4) to negotiate the beneficiary's
documents, usually against a draft drawn on the issuer," rather than a
draft drawn on the nominated bank.16
Grievances recognized by Article 5 arise in the following
circumstances:
(1) advisor mistake
The advisor misadvises the terms of the credit, and the beneficiary
suffers loss.' 7
(2) wrongful dishonor

10. See U.C.C. § 5-107(a) (2002); cf U.C.P. 600 art. 8 (describing confirmer's
undertaking).
11. A draft is an order to pay money, customarily negotiable in form. See U.C.C. § 3104(e) (2002). Under a payment credit, the draft is payable at sight, that is, on demand.
For an illustration of a sight draft, see DOLAN, TERMS & TRANSACTIONS, supra note 5, at
document 4-2.
12. Unless the credit requires one or the other, a demand for payment may be
negotiable or non-negotiable. See, e.g., First State Bank v. Shuford Mills, Inc., 716
S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); cf Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 394 F.
Supp. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated, 550 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding "please remit"
sufficient demand).
13. "Accept" as it is used here is a term of art. The party that accepts is an acceptor.
See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(1) (2002). A draft that is accepted becomes an "acceptance." See
U.C.C. § 3-409(a) (2002).
14. A time draft, sometimes called a "usance" draft, is payable some fixed period of
time after a certain date or at some specified future date. Typically, a time draft is payable
a certain number of days after sight. For an illustration of a time draft, see DOLAN, TERMS
& TRANSACTIONS, supra note 5, at document 4-2.

15. U.C.P. 600 art. 2(c) (defining "negotiation").
16. These four forms of honoring a letter of credit are explained in UCP 600 arts. 7 &
8. Most letters of credit incorporate the UCP. This paper assumes that UCC Article 5
governs the remedies available to the parties to the letter of credit transaction. Although
most letters of credit incorporate the Uniform Customs, with exceptions not relevant to
this paper, Article 5 stipulates that in the event of conflict between Article 5 and the UCP,
the UCP governs. See U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. 2 (2002). On the remedy issues, however, the
UCP and Article 5 are not in conflict. The UCP does not fashion remedies. Rather,
Article 5 does. See U.C.C. §§ 5-110, 5-111 (2002).
17. U.C.C. § 5-111 (2002).
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The issuer, the nominated bank, or the confirmer dishonors without
justification, and the beneficiary or the applicant suffers loss.' 8
(3) wrongful honor
The issuer, the nominated bank, or the confirmer honors when it
should have dishonored, and the wrongful honor damages the
applicant. 19
(4) breach of warranty
The beneficiary obtains payment under the credit
(a) by presenting documents to the issuer, the nominated bank or
the confirmer that are materially fraudulent or forged, or
(b) when such payment constitutes a breach of the underlying
contract that the credit serves, in the illustration, the international sales
contract.2 0
In addition, Article 5 alludes to two causes of action but obviously
defers to other law that governs them. Those causes arise when:
(5) post honor default
Obligors on bankers' acceptances or deferred payment obligations
default. 2 1

(6) improvidently granted injunctions
Obligees on bonds issued under UCC § 5-109(b)(2) suffer loss when
applicants or others obtain injunctive relief improvidently.22
It helps the analysis to examine these failures in the letter of credit
transaction under three headings:
(1) beneficiary claims;
(2) applicant claims; and
(3) issuer and third-party claims.
Yet, before this paper embarks on that analysis, it is necessary to
discuss the contours of and policy reason for the economic loss doctrine.
That discussion yields a doctrine with somewhat ragged contours and
fractured policy footings, yet the investigation supports application of the
doctrine in Article 5 litigation.

18. Id.
19. U.C.C. § 5-515 cmt. 2 (2002).

20. U.C.C. § 5-110 (2002).
21. U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 4 (2002).
22. U.C.C. § 5-109(b)(2) (2002).
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III. THE ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE AND SIMILAR DOCTRINES
A. In Sale of Goods Transactions

The notion that the economic loss doctrine applies to all economic
losses is misleading. Under the doctrine, some losses that are truly
economic, as opposed to those that result from tortious behavior, are
recoverable; some are not. Professor Nimmer refers to the doctrine as
the "so-called 'economic loss doctrine."' 24 In its major sale-of-goods
role, the doctrine prevents an aggrieved party from asserting claims in
tort for damage to property that the aggrieved party purchased from the
defendant.25 In some cases, the aggrieved party may use tort theories to
recover damage to "other property," that is, property other than that
purchased, and to recover damage to persons.26 Neither of those claims,
damage to "other property" or damage to persons, are economic under
the doctrine, even though such losses are in fact, if not under the
doctrine's misuse of the term, economic.
23. See, e.g., Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 18 (Wash. 1993)
(defining "economic loss" for purposes of the doctrine as "the cost of replacing and
repairing the yachts"); see also Sacramento Reg'1 Transit Dist. v. Grumman, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 736, 738-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing recovery for economic damage to
the product itself but denying economic losses such as lost profits). The Restatement
(Third) of Torts limits economic losses that are recoverable in tort to losses as a result of
harm caused to the "[a] the plaintiff's person; or [b] the person of another when harm to
the other interferes with an interest of the plaintiff protected by tort law; or [c] the
plaintiffs property other than the defective product itself." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LIABILITY § 21 (1998). For an article parsing the various kinds of losses

that are recoverable or not recoverable under the doctrine and citing the cases that
disclose the inconsistent treatment of the doctrine by the various states, see Ralph
Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss from NonEconomic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081 (2008).

24. Raymond Nimmer, Images and Contract Law-What Law Applies to
Transactions in Information, 36 Hous. L. REV. 1, 49 (1999).
25. See, e.g., Isla Nena Servs., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 449 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2006)
(applying Puerto Rican law); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. RFI Supply, Inc., 440 F.3d 549,
552 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying New Hampshire law); HDM Flugservice GMBH v. Parker
Hannifin Corp., 332 F.3d 1025 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Ohio law); Moorman Mfg. Co.
v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982); Stanton, 866 P.2d at 18. Professor Dobbs
calls this rule the "stand-alone economic loss" rule. Dan Dobbs, An Introduction to NonStatutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 725 (2006). Professor Anzivino
distinguishes damage to goods sold (economic losses) from damage to other goods (noneconomic losses), the former being subject to contract remedies, the latter to tort
remedies. See generally Anzivino, supra note 23.
26. See generally Anzivino, supra note 23. For cases rejecting this distinction, see,
e.g., Neibarger v. Universal Coops., 486 N.W.2d 612, 620 (Mich. 1992); Detroit Edison
Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236, 242 (6th Cir. 1994) (following Neibarger).

2011]

LETTER OF CREDITLITIGATION

1275

The doctrine has found ready application in the sale of goods setting,
where courts will deny tort recovery for losses to the "product," the item
purchased by the aggrieved party. 27 Those same courts hold generally,
however, that losses to other property and to persons occasioned by the
"product's" defects are recoverable in tort. 28 The purchaser of a defective
grain storage tank cannot use tort causes of action to recover the cost of
repairing the tank. The tank is the property, not other property, and the
buyer's only remedy is in contract.29
Not all jurisdictions delimit the doctrine with this distinction between
the "property" purchased and other property and personal injury.
Purchasers of equipment to milk dairy cows that was itself defective,
injured the cows, and caused lost profits could not resort to tort causes of
action because
Generally speaking, tort principles, such as negligence, are better
suited for resolving claims involving unanticipated physical
injury, particularly those arising out of an accident. Contract
principles, on the other hand, are generally more appropriate for
determining claims for consequential damage that the parties
have, or could have, addressed in their agreement.3 0
The justification for the doctrine in the sale of goods setting rests on
the notion that, at the least, in the business-to-business transaction,
buyers and sellers can negotiate warranty terms that reflect their
perceptions of efficiencies.3 Thus, some courts have said contract law is
better suited to deal with allocation of risk of damage to the goods sold.
27. See, e.g., Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661 (3d. Cir. 2002).
28. See, e.g., Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997);
Schiavone Constr., Inc. v. Elgoos Mayo Corp., 436 N.E.2d 1322 (N.Y. 1982); Moorman
Mfg. Co., 435 N.E.2d 443.
29. See Moorman Mfg. Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (emphasis added). Cf Thiele v. Oddy's
Auto & Marine, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 158 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (making similar distinction but
holding seller liable).
30. Neibarger,486 N.W.2d at 612 (citations omitted). Cf Wash. Water Power Co. v.
Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 1199 (Wash. 1989), modified by Wash. Water Power Co. v.
Graybar Elec. Co., 779 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1989) (distinguishing economic losses more
properly covered by tort law's safety concerns than by contract law's bargain concerns).
Washington Water Power invokes Washington's "risk of harm analysis" in applying the
economic loss doctrine. Reyton Cedar Knoll, LLC v. HPG Int'l Inc., 289 F. App. 547 (3d
Cir. 2008) (applying doctrine to cost of repairing defective roof and consequential
damage to interior of building). See also Staton Hills Winery Co. v. Collons, 980 P.2d
784 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (doctrine prevents recovery for damage to tank defendant sold
to plaintiff and to tank's contents).
31. SaratogaFishingCo., 520 U.S. at 879-80.
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However, that argument does not, in the view of some, justify denial of
tort claims for losses to other property or to persons, damages that tort
law, especially product liability law, handles better.32
In the commercial setting, the explanation is convincing.33
Commercial buyers are in the best position to know whether they want to
pay for a warranty, and commercial sellers know whether the price they
charge for goods covers the warranty that the buyer seeks.34 Presumably,
a commercial buyer is in a better position than a commercial seller to
know whether the buyer should spend time and money on quality
assurance that goods it receives from the seller meet the buyer's product
tolerances, whether the buyer is better served by relying on the seller's
general quality assurance program, or whether the, buyer should pay the
seller for additional quality testing.
It is worth mentioning that the varying effects of statutes of
limitations often play a critical role in economic loss doctrine cases.
Because UCC Article 2 generally allows parties to agree to a one-year
statute35 that begins to run on delivery of the goods, 3 6 and tort statutes
generally begin to run only after the aggrieved party learns of or should
learn of the defect,37 plaintiffs who cannot meet the Article 2 statute have
no recovery if the economic loss doctrine applies.3 1 In addition, tort

32. For an early case accepting this distinction, see Seely v. White Motor Co., 403
P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965) (en banc). For a more recent and typical case, see Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Damman & Co., 594 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting product liability
cross claim when losses were economic only).
33. The Supreme Court in E. River S.S. Corp. v. TransamericaDelaval Inc., 476 U.S.
858 (1986) noted that "a commercial situation generally does not involve large disparities
in bargaining power." Id. at 873. In Werwinski, the court applied the doctrine against a
consumer purchaser, declining to "engag[e] in a case-by-case, fact intensive inquir[y] to
determine [a commercial or a consumer] plaintiffs level of sophistication." Werwinski,
286 F.3d at 663.
34. For a strong argument supporting that point and making the further point that not
all buyers should be saddled with those costs when only a small number of buyers will
benefit from the warranty, see George Priest, A Theory of Consumer Product Warranty,
90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1299 (1981).
35. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (2002).
36. See U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
37. See, e.g., Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
2008). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 899 cmt. (e) (1979).
38. See AKA Distrib. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 137 F.3d 1083, 1085, 1087 (8th Cir.
1998) (holding that contract claim was time-barred by Article 2 four-year statute of
limitations and fraud claim was barred by economic loss doctrine); Neibarger, 486
N.W.2d at 623 (holding that plaintiff s claims were governed by UCC and therefore timebarred); Dockhorn v. Kitchens By Kleweno, 71 UCC Rep. Serv. (West) 332 (D. Kan.
2010) (holding that injuries to other property were governed by the two-year tort statute
of limitations, not the UCC four-year statute, but that the action was timely brought).
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causes of action allow recovery of consequential damages 3 9 and may
allow recovery of punitive damages. 4 0 Under UCC Article 2, limitations
on consequential damages in sales contracts are generally allowed and,
understandably, are often adopted by merchant sellers. 41 Article 5
generally disallows consequential and punitive damages against letter of
credit issuers, most often, financial institutions.4 2
Application of the economic loss doctrine is not limited to sales
transactions subject to the UCC. Courts applying federal admiralty law
have resorted to the doctrine and been instrumental in fashioning its
contours.4 3 The principles of the doctrine, moreover, sometimes find
application under other rubrics, such as the "gist of the case or gist of the
action doctrine"44 or the "East River doctrine." 45 The gist of the case or
Even if the UCC's four-year statute applies, it may bar warranty actions that are not
barred under tort law's statute. See, e.g., Staton Hills Winery Co., 980 P.2d at 784.
39. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 917 (1979) ("One who tortiously
harms the person or property of another is subject to liability for damages for the
consequences of the harm . . .
40. Id. § 90 1(c) cmt. c.
41. The statute of limitations under UCC Article 2 is four years, but the parties may
reduce the limitation period to one year, but not less. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (2003). The
rule under the amendments to the official version of UCC Article 2 is similar, but with an
exception for transactions involving sales to consumers. The exception does not permit
any reduction in the limitation period for such sales. That version of Article 2 has not
been adopted by any jurisdiction, however. See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, UCC
Act,
by
Report
Legislative
(2003),
AND
2A
2
ARTICLES
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/LegReports/LegRpt.Act.pdf (last visited July 30,
2012). Article 2 also permits sellers to disclaim liability for consequential damages and to
limit damages to replacement and repair of product defects. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3)
(2002). This last limitation on consequential damages is unavailable to a seller that seeks
to disclaim consequential damages for personal injuries from defects in consumer goods.
Id. For an illustration of that practice, see Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys.,
91 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 1996).
42. See U.C.C. § 5-111(a), (b), & (c) (2002).
43. See infra text accompanying note 45.
44. The "gist of the action" doctrine holds that "contract actions arise from breach of
duties mutually agreed to, while torts have their basis in violations of duties imposed as a
matter of social policy." Sunquest Info. Sys., Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 40 F.
Supp. 2d 644, 651 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (citations omitted). Under the doctrine, the aggrieved
party may sue in tort only if the tort claims are collateral to the contract action. See, e.g.,
Sun Apparel Warehouse, Inc. v. Nike, Inc. (In re Sun Apparel Warehouse, Inc.), No. 0137760DWS 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 511, at *19 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. May 22, 2003) (describing
Pennsylvania's gist of the action doctrine: "[A] party cannot simply recast an ordinary
breach of contract claim into a tort claim and in so doing, create a separate and distinct
cause of action."). Cf Little Souls, Inc. v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., No. 03-5722 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4569, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2004) (holding by way of dictum that
"when a plaintiff alleges that the defendant committed a tort in the course of carrying out
a contractual agreement . .. a tort claim is maintainable only if the contract is 'collateral'
to conduct that is primarily tortious.").
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gist of the action doctrine distinguishes breach of duties arising out of a
contractual relationship from torts arising from actions extrinsic to the
contract. The former breaches cannot support tort claims, while the latter
may.4 6 The Supreme Court in East River, applying federal admiralty law,
used economic loss theory to limit the liability of the seller of goods.47
Sale of goods transactions are easy candidates for these doctrines.
Widespread litigation is far from a free good, and a cause of action is a
problematic asset. When the manufacturer of pressure gear for the
bicycle industry receives orders from the National Space Administration,
quality assurance by NASA is a superior allocation of costs and yields
social savings that would be lost if the law unthinkingly imposed quality
assurance costs on the manufacturer. In this setting, caveat emptor makes
economic sense, while in other settings, it may not. 4 8
B. In Non-Sale of Goods Transactions
Court application of these doctrines to service contracts where
Article 2 warranty bargaining theory does not apply is uneven. Many
courts are willing to invoke the doctrine in settings where warranty
theory is weak.4 9 Warranty theory is not alone in serving as justification
for the economic loss limitations in the sale of goods setting. Some
courts justify the doctrine in that setting simply for the reason that the
45. The Supreme Court fashioned an economic loss rule in admiralty in E. River S.S.
Corp., 476 U.S. 858. For cases invoking the doctrine of that case, see, e.g., Turbomeca,
S.A. v. Era Helicopters LLC, 536 F.3d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 2008); Brown v. Eurocopter
S.A., 143 F. Supp. 2d 781, 783 (S.D. Tex. 2001); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Huls Am., 893
F. Supp. 465, 468 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
46. See, e.g., Little Souls, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4569, at *5; In re Sun Apparel
Warehouse, Inc., 2003 Bankr. LEXIS at *18-19.
47. E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 874.
48. "[T]he conservative side in the legal culture war believes customers should insist
on warranties to protect themselves against deceptive practices, and if they don't, caveat
emptor, which is Latin for 'Lump it."' Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and
Mass-Market Customers: Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the
Common Law of Fraud,48 ARIZ. L. REv. 829, 833 (2006). But cf Moin Yahya, Can I
Sue Without Being Injured?: Why the Benefit of the BargainTheory for Product Liability
is Bad Law and Bad Economics, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 103 (2005) (arguing that
even in the consumer sale setting, contract law, not tort theory, should govern claims that
do not involve personal injuries).
49. See, e.g., Am. United Logistics, Inc. & Cent. Am. Warehouse Co. v. Catellus
Dev. Corp., 319 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2003); Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477
(9th Cir. 1995); Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau v. Suwannee River Spa Lines, Inc., 866 F.2d 752
(5th Cir. 1989); Sundance Cruises Corp. v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 799 F. Supp. 363
(S.D. N.Y. 1992); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 466-67 (Wis.
2004) (refusing to invoke economic loss doctrine in sale that court characterized as one
for services).
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legislature has fashioned the duties of banks under UCC Articles and that
the common law of tort should not upset it.so This justification rests on

50. To alter the liability scheme adopted by Article 5 "would disrupt the letter of
credit transaction as structured by [Article 5] and would hinder the commercial viability
of the letter of credit." Auto Servicio San Ignacio, S.L.R. v. Compania Anonima
Venezolana de Navegacion, 765 F.2d 1306, 1308 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting and affirming
district court in stating, "In large part then in adapting letter of credit principles to varying
situations in a way that encourages the use of letters of credit is the approved task under
Article 5; adapting tort principles not expressly adopted and that tend to discourage the
use of such devices is not."); Instituto Nacional de Comercialization Agricola (Indeca) v.
Cont'l Ill. Nat. Bank, 858 F.2d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1988) (commenting on the
theoretical basis for interpreting and applying Article 5 and refusing to apply tort law).
Accord, Confeccoes Texteis de Vouzela, LDA v. Riggs Nat'l Bank of Wash. D.C., 994
F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Krause v. Stroh Brewery Co., 240 F. Supp. 2d 632 (E.D.
Mich. 2002). Cf Fischer & Mandell, LLP v. Citibank, N.A., 632 F.3d 793 (2d Cir. 2011)
(ruling that UCC Article 4 precludes common law claims but permits parties to alter the
article's liability scheme by agreement); Advanced Dental Care, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank,
816 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D. Md. 2011) (holding that UCC § 3-420 preempts negligence
claim); Int'l Trade Relationship & Export v. Citibank, N.A., No. 98 Civ. 8569, 2000 WE
343899 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000) (applying similar reasoning in UCC litigation); Great
Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Austin Bank, 837 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (denying
recovery in tort in part because UCC Article 3 fashions scheme for allocating liabilities
among banks and in part because economic loss doctrine would deny recovery); Pertierra
v. Bank of Am., 66 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (unpublished
opinion) (holding that UCC pre-empts negligence claim against bank); Mandolfo v.
Mandolfo, 796 N.W.2d 603 (Neb. 2011) (holding that Article 3 displaces claims for
negligence by bank in allowing thief to deposit claimant's checks to thief's account, and
applying UCC statute of limitations rather that tort statute); Promissor, Inc. v. Branch
Bank & Trust Co., No. 1:08-CV-1704-BBM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98472, at *7 (N.D.
Ga. Oct. 31, 2008) (citing Crosson v. Lancaste, 427 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993))
(disallowing negligence claim against bank when claim would "thwart the purposes of
the Code"); Texas Stadium Corp. v. Say. of Am., 933 S.W.2d 616, 622 (Tex. Ct. App.
1996) (Article 3 precluding claims for negligence, conversion, and money had and
received). See also Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84 (2d
Cir. 2010) (holding that UCC § 4A-505 barred common law claims for allegedly
unauthorized wire transfers); Crawford v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 70 UCC Rep.
Serv. 2d (West) 96, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (Article 3 statute of limitations preempting
causes of action for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment);
Rector v. Harlstad Farmers Elev., 66 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 777 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008) (Article 2 breach of warranty rules preempt common law cause of action for breach
of contract); but cf Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., 693 F. Supp. 2d 692 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(holding that UCC Article 3 does not displace cause of action for money had and
received); EPCO Carbonoxide Prods., Inc. v. Bank One, B.A., No. 04-2324, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 33719 (W.D. La. May 8, 2007) (refusing to invoke economic loss doctrine
to bar claim for breach of contract to issue letter of credit); Bucci v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A., 591 F. Supp. 2d 773 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that UCC § 4-406 does not preclude
negligence and breach of contract counts against drawee bank); Busy Bee, Inc. v.
Wachovia Bank, No. 97CV5078, 2006 Pa. Dts. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 238, at *60 (Feb.
28, 2006) (refusing to apply gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract and tort
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the idea that the legislature has fashioned the parties' remedies and that
the remedies are exclusive.s5
It may not suffice, however, to infer a limitation against tort recovery
from a statutory provision for remedies. Unless the legislative regime is
expressly preemptive or unless invoking torts rather clearly disturbs the
legislative scheme, courts may go too far when they inhibit tort recovery
in non-sale settings. When the legislative scheme serves a clear policy of
limiting recovery, some courts feel justified in invoking the doctrine. 52
In non-sale cases, moreover, courts and commentators look for some
kind of relationship between the parties that justifies application of
liability for negligence. Professor Nimmer's conclusions regarding
liability for negligent representation are instructive. He concludes that
most courts will enforce tort liability for negligent misrepresentation
"only if there is a special relationship with the provider in which the
information is intended to influence the recipient's acts."5 One
indication of such intimacy lies in notions of privity, which, as one court
has observed, "is not a wholly artificial concept." 54
actions against issuer for wrongful dishonor). For criticism of the Busy Bee case, see 1
DOLAN TREATISE at T 7.07 (2011 Cum. Supp. No. 2).
51. See, e.g., SMI Owen Steel Co. v. Marsh USA Inc., 520 F.3d 432, 443 (5th Cir.
2008) (refusing to apply economic loss doctrine to prohibit tort action against insurance
broker that failed to fulfill statutorily created duty); Banco del Estado v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. 111.1997) (permitting issuer to claim against
beneficiary of a letter of credit in fraud and rejecting beneficiary's claim that warranty
section in pre-revised Article 5 provided sole remedy for fraud). In the interest of candor,
this author must admit that in his treatise, he approved the court's ruling in Banco del
Estado, an approval that in retrospect he now regards as ill-advised. See I DOLAN
TREATISE, supra note 50, at 9-85.
52. Some courts resort to the Code's policy provision, Section 1-103, to delimit the
use of tort theories to supplement the UCC. See, e.g., Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., 693 F.
Supp. 2d 693 (holding that UCC § 3-420 does not displace but limits use of money had
and received cause of action and, therefore, that UCC § 1-103 allows cause of action).
That section articulates the Code policy of supplementing Code provisions with common
law principles, "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of' the Code. U.C.C. § I 103 (2002).
53. Nimmer, supra note 24, at 52.
54. Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 956 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1017 (1982). Actions by letter of credit applicants against confirmers or nominated
banks and claims by confirmers and nominated banks against applicants are prime
candidates for application of that doctrine if the claims rest on contract law. Yet, the
scope of privity is narrow. Its protection against claims does not reach tort claims, the
claims this paper argues should not arise in most letter of credit litigation. For authority
suggesting that the absence of privity in product liability cases prevents application of the
economic loss doctrine, see Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 399 F.3d
1275, 1276 (1lth Cir. 2005). Presumably, the absence of privity prevented the aggrieved
party from negotiating loss allocation with the defendant. There being no such
opportunity, the economic loss doctrine does not apply.

2011]

LETTER OF CREDIT LITIGATION

128 1

C. Exceptions for Intentional Torts
Before examining the applicability of the economic loss doctrine to
UCC Article 5, it is helpful to examine important limits some courts have
fashioned for it. These limits arise out of the breaching party's bad faith,
fraud or intentional wrong. While courts apply the doctrine to forbid
actions based on negligent performance of duty, 5 negligent
misrepresentation, and product or strict liability, 7 there is authority that
actions constituting bad faith such as deceit, intentional
misrepresentation or common law fraud, survive application of the
doctrine. It may be that the doctrine should prohibit even those causes
of action, though that argument finds little support in the rationales
courts have offered for the doctrine, 9 and the cases are in disarray. 6 0 As
55. See, e.g., Am. United Logistics, Inc., 319 F.3d at 921; DetroitEdison Co., 35 F.3d
at 236; Neibarger,486 N.W.2d at 612. Cf Sundance Cruises Corp., 799 F. Supp. at 383
(applying doctrine to prohibit claim for damages resulting from defendant's gross
negligence).
56. See e.g., Holden Farms, Inc. v. Hog Slat, Inc., 347 F.3d 1055 (8th Cir. 2003);
HDM Flugservice GMBH, 332 F.3d 1025. Contra Level 3 Comm'ns, LLC v. Liebert
Corp., 535 F.3d 1146, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008).
57. See, e.g., Thiele, 906 F. Supp. at 158; Va. Surety Co. Inc. v. Am. Eurocopter
Corp., 955 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Haw. 1996); Stanton, 866 P.2d at 18.
58. See, e.g., Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 876 (9th Cir.
2007); Cerabio LLC v. Phillips Plastics Corp., 410 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 2005); In re
Chicago Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. 1997). Professor Dobbs would not limit such
tort claims if the torts are "independent." Arguably, then, fraud in a related transaction
would not be subject to the tort, but fraud in the letter of credit transaction itself, say, by
the issuer or the beneficiary, would be subject to the doctrine. See Dobbs, supra note 25,
at 728. Professor Anzivino notes that some courts have applied the doctrine if the fraud is
not "intrinsic to the contract." See Anzivino, supra note 23, at 1096. For authority
suggesting a distinction between fraud that is "interwoven" with an undertaking and fraud
that is "extraneous" to it, see Christopher J. Farielli, Comment, Wading into the Morass:
An Inquiry into the ApplicationofNew Jersey'sEconomic Loss Rule to FraudClaims, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 717, 730 (2004) (footnote omitted); and for authority that the fraud
exception extends to fraud that induces a party to enter into a transaction, see Steven C.
Tourek, Thomas H. Boyd, & Charles J. Schoenwetter, Bucking the "Trend": The
Uniform Commercial Code, the Economic Loss Doctrine, and Common Law Causes of
Action for FraudandMisrepresentation,84 IOWA L. REV. 875 (1999).
59. One court used the doctrine to bar a buyer's claim for misrepresentation of
product history. The court held that the buyer's decision to rely on the representation was
a contractual decision, that is, a decision not to seek warranty or other contract protection
and, therefore, that the economic loss doctrine barred the claim. See Rich Prods. Corp. v.
Kemutec Inc., 241 F.3d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 2001). See also Cerabio, 410 F.3d 981
(summary judgment on claims for fraud and negligent representation and negligent
misrepresentation in breach of contract dispute); Holden Farms, Inc., 347 F.3d at 1062
(economic loss doctrine bars negligent misrepresentation claim in warranty breach
setting); Instituto Nacional De Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Ill.
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we shall see, however, Article 5 suggests that instances of "material"
fraud 6 1 give rise to breach of warranty claims and that invoking tort law
in the event of beneficiary fraud is not necessary. Article 5 limits liability
for fraudulent draws, providing protection to issuers and applicants
through the warranty section, 62 and limits the liability of beneficiaries,
which are often banks, to actual damages proved.
In the sale of goods setting, one cannot contend that a buyer whose
seller has engaged in such intentional misbehavior can properly negotiate
warranties. The whole purpose of negotiation is to allocate risks on the
basis of honest dealing, which yields efficient allocation of resources.
Intentional bad faith, intentional misrepresentation, and common law
fraud with its intention feature interfere with proper allocation of
resources and should survive application of the economic loss doctrine in
the sale of goods setting where courts have invoked warranty theory as
the doctrine's predicate.
In situations relying on the presence of a statutory scheme as the
predicate, one might move more cautiously in forbidding claims based
on these commercially baleful practices. Without clear direction from the
statute, the better course is to sustain such claims. There is always the
risk, of course, that the trier of fact will misapply the higher proof
burdens that the law imposes in these instances, 64 but weaknesses of the
trial system are not the subject of this paper, which assumes, perhaps at
the risk of Pollyannaism, that judges and jurors follow the law.
Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 675 F. Supp. 1515 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff'd, 858 F.2d 1264 (7th
Cir. 1988) (suit denying claim against letter of credit confirmer for negligent
misrepresentation); but cf Level 3 Comm ns, LLC, 535 F.3d at 1163 (allowing claim for
negligent misrepresentation that arose "independently of the [a]greement"). Professor
Anzivino complains that the fraud exception to the doctrine is too narrow. See Anzivino,
supranote 23. Professor Braucher would disagree. See Braucher,supra note 48.
60. Professors White and Summers summarize the situation: "In some states this now
burgeoning common law doctrine has achieved the status of the 'economic loss doctrine,'
meaning that once loss is defined as 'economic' it cannot be recovered at least in
negligence or strict tort and perhaps not in fraud or misrepresentation." J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 539 (6th ed. 2010). For more of the cases and
discussion of them, see R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract:Application of
the Economic Loss Rule to Fraudand Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1789 (2000).
61. U.C.C. § 5-109(a) (2002).
62. U.C.C. § 5-110 (2002).
63. U.C.C. § 5-111 (2002).
64. The burden of proof in fraud cases is usually one of "clear and convincing"
evidence. See, e.g., BancOklahoma Mortg. Corp. v. Capital Title Co. Inc., 194 F.3d 1089,
1104 (10th Cir. 1999); D.R.C.D.T., Inc. v. Integrity Ins. Co., 816 F.2d 273, 278 (6th
Cir.1987) (holding burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence applicable to every
case involving fraud).
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With respect to the bad faith claims, one must take account of the
curious nature of that term. Essentially, "good faith" is an excluder, that
is, the absence of "bad faith."65 Generally, the UCC imposes two
requirements for good faith: "[1] honesty in fact and [2] observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." 66 Under the UCC's
general definition, then, bad faith is either dishonesty or failure to
observe the standards, both of which are rather more easily discernable
than honesty and reasonable observance. UCC Article 5, however,
departs from the dual feature good faith definition limiting good faith to
honesty in fact alone.67 Thus, in Article 5, the subject of this paper, the
only instance of bad faith is dishonesty.
The distinction obviously narrows the good faith requirement. It also
signals legislative concern that reasonableness, the critical ingredient of
the second good faith requirement, not be a matter of litigation in Article
5 6 8-a matter that this paper suggests below informs the scope of the
economic loss doctrine's applicability in Article 5.
D. Conclusions Regarding the Doctrine'sPolicies
This summary does little to resolve the numerous conflicts in
application of the doctrine to various settings, and little to fashion the
doctrine's limits as a general matter.69 The summary does show,
however, that courts use what Professor Dobbs suggests is pragmatism as
a rational approach to application of the doctrine.70 He concludes that
"economic harm poses a threat of infinite economic repercussions and
that a limit should be imposed by denying the negligence claim where
there is real threat of such repercussions." 7 The language of Article 5
65. The leading article is Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract
Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195,
196, 232-43 (1968).
66. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2002).
67. U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(7) (2002); cf U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (excluding Article 5 from
the general "good faith" definition).
68. U.C.C. § 5-102 cmt. 3 (2002).
69. "[T]he American law of liability for purely economic losses is much less well
settled and less uniform than one might wish it to be." Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability
for PureEconomic Loss under American Tort Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 125 (1998).
70. Dobbs, supranote 25, at 714.
71. Id. Cf John Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort
Reform, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1929, 1946 (1988) (dealing with third-party claims for
negligence and counting economic loss doctrine as "[a]mong the most important"
doctrines fashioned by courts even when losses are foreseeable to deny recovery in virtue
of "apprehensive[ness] about the vastly expanded tort liability," Id. at 1934. But, listing
exaggerated damages claims, fraudulent claims, and lower standards of care as further
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discloses a clear legislative purpose to spike the threat of infinite
economic repercussions. 72 Application of the doctrine serves that
legislative purpose; invocation of tort remedies disserves it. Judge Posner
reaches similar conclusions.7 3 In short, persuasive commentary, looking
not at Article 5 but at the economic loss doctrine as a general principle,
urges restraint of one sort or another against a loose tort regime. Analysis
of the economic loss doctrine in Article 5 begins with a search for
reasons to limit tort in letter of credit transactions. That search yields
results that sometimes cut in favor of limits and, at other times, against
them, but reading the statute as a whole favors prohibition of torts in the
causes of action this paper addresses.
IV. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT
Letters of credit are not negotiable instruments.7 4 Nor are they
suretyship undertakings.75 Although courtS76 and Article 5 itself 77 are
sometimes inclined to refer to the letter of credit as a contract, that
characterization is also misleading. The letter of credit is an
"idiosyncratic form of undertaking." 78 Its nature was for many years the
subject of intense debate among Commonwealth nation scholars, who
seem to have given up on determining what letters of credit are.79 Some
concerns). See also Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The
Examples ofJ'Aire and ofProductsLiability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37 (1986).

72. See U.C.C. § 5-111 (2002).
73. See Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 735, 736-39 (2006) (concluding that courts should approach
claims pragmatically, entertaining the claims in some cases, dismissing them in others,
with the purpose in all cases of serving three economic policies underpinning the
economic loss doctrine: rejecting claims (1) when the loss is personal rather than social;
(2) when it is difficult for the defendant to estimate potential losses; and (3) when it is
difficult "to delimit the victims").
74. First, they are not instruments as the UCC defines that term. See U.C.C. § 3104(b) (2002). Moreover, they do not satisfy the formal requisites for negotiability. See
U.C.C. § 3-104(a).
75. See U.C.C. § 5-102 cmt. 6 (2002); U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. 1.
76. See, e.g., Exxon Co. v. Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, 889 F.2d 674, 678 (5th
Cir. 1989); Kerr Constr. Co. v. Plains Nat'1 Bank, 753 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
But cf Montgomery Ward, LLC v. Wiseknit Factory, Ltd. (In re Montgomery Ward,
LLC), 292 B.R. 49, 54-55 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (tiring of the practice of treating letters
of credit as contracts, the court observed: "[t]he unwashed characterize the letter of credit
as a contract between the beneficiary and the issuer . . .").
77. For a UCC official comment using similar locution, see U.C.C. § 5-114 cmt. 1
(2002).
78. U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. (2002).
79. ALI MALEK
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5.1 (4th ed.

2009) (the leading U.K. treatise characterizing letter of credit as "binding contract").
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pre-code scholars treated the letter of credit as a "commercial specialty"
akin to a sealed instrument.80
We know, however, that letters of credit need no consideration to be
binding.8 ' They come into existence without the parties' observance of
the offer-and-acceptance paradigm of contract formation, 82 and must be
in the form of a "record."8 3 Letters of credit may not be issued by
individuals for "personal, family, or household purposes,"8 and are
irrevocable even though silent on revocability and even though there is
no reliance on them. Finally, they can give rise to an important and
strict estoppel against their issuers, that is, a preclusion that arises
without any showing of detriment or reliance. 86 Letters of credit,
moreover, are generally subject to the formalism that contract law has
eschewed. They terminate on their stated expiry without regard to any
beneficiary excuse for tardiness87 and are generally subject to the perfecttender rule that contract law long ago jettisoned. Most of the time,
letters of credit are subject to international rules formulated especially for
them by a trade association, the International Chamber of Commerce.8 9
A subset of them, the standby letter of credit, is the subject of a United
Nations Convention.9 o When banks, which issue most letters of credit,
Clive Schmitthoff took a different view at an earlier time, referring to the letter of credit
as "an institution sui generis." Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Transferable Credit, 1988 J.
Bus. L. 49, 51 (1988).
80. See Morton C. Campbell, Guaranties and the Suretyship Phases of Letters of
Credit, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 175, 261 (1936-37); Rufus J. Trimble, The Law Merchant and
the Letter of Credit, 61 HARV. L. REV. 981 (1948); Omar F. Hershey, Letters of Credit, 32
HARV. L. REV. I (1918).
81. U.C.C. § 5-105 (2002). This is not a new rule. It codifies the eighteenth century
holding of Lord Mansfield in Pillans v. Van Mierop, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B.); 3
Burr. 1663. See U.C.C. § 5-105 cmt. For the view that Lord Mansfield's ruling was the
"conspicuous failure of a great judge," see William E. McCurdy, Commercial Letters of
Credit,35 HARV. L. REv. 539, 565 (1922).
82. U.C.C. § 5-106(a) (2002).
83. U.C.C. § 5-104 (2002).
84. U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(9) (2002).
85. U.C.C. § 5-106(a) (2002).
86. See U.C.C. § 5-108(c) (2002); Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs
and Practicefor Documenting Credits, I.C.C. Pub. No. 600 art. 16(f) (2006).
87. See, e.g., K.G. Cornwall, LLC v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 07 Civ. 2881, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15909 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2008); Todi Exports v. Amrav Sportswear,
Inc., No. 95 Civ. 6701 (BJS), 1997 WL 61063, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1997).
88. As a general rule, beneficiaries can expect issuers to honor if the beneficiary's
presentation "appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the
letter of credit." U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (2002).
89. See U.C.P. 600, supra note 9.
90. See 1995-UnitedNations Convention on Independent Guaranteesand Stand-By
Letters
of
Credit,
UNCITRAL,
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issue such undertakings, the form of their obligation and their practices
are subject to special bank regulations fashioned for letters of credit.91
The critical point of all this is that letters of credit are unique
commercial devices, not negotiable instruments, not suretyship
undertakings, and not contracts. Except to the extent precedent discloses
the policies that the economic loss doctrine serves, the decision whether
to apply .the economic loss doctrine in letter of credit cases rests on the
nature of the credit undertaking and not on precedent dealing with
contracts or other obligations. As this discussion of the doctrine's history
and application discloses, courts have fashioned the doctrine not so much
as positive law but rather as a prerogative that permits them to apply it
selectively. Whether the nature of letters of credit supports selective
application or universal application is the question this paper addresses
next.
V. BENEFICIARY CAUSES OF ACTION

A. For Wrongful Dishonor
When the letter of credit issuer dishonors the beneficiary's
complying presentation, the beneficiary may face three kinds of loss: (1)
loss of the funds that the issuer should have paid; (2) consequential
damages; and (3) in commercial letter of credit transactions, incidental
expenses incurred salvaging goods that may be in transit or rotting on a
dock. 92 In the commercial letter of credit transaction, however, the
beneficiary may be able to recoup all or part of its loss by reselling the
goods to a third party. The Article 5 remedy provision addresses in
subsection (a) each of those losses and the possibility that the beneficiary
might chose to mitigate its damages. 93 Significantly, section 5-111(a)
measures the pecuniary loss by the amount of the beneficiary's draw on
the credit without requiring the beneficiary to mitigate. 94 The
disappointed beneficiary, then, may let the goods rot and still recover in

http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/payments/I 995Convention guarantees
credit.html (last visited July 30, 2012).
91. For the federal regulation, see Comptroller of the Currency, Dep't of the
Treasury., 12 C.F.R. § 7.1016 (2008). For a similar state regulation, see Investments in
Commercial, Corporate and Business Loans by Savings Banks and Saving & Loan
Associations; Leasing Transactions; Letters of Credit, 3 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 3 § 77.5 (2012).
92. U.C.C. § 5-111(a) (2002).
93. Id.
94. Id
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full, plus interest on the unpaid amount.9 5 The beneficiary may also
recover incidental damages and attorney's fees, if they are incurred. 9 6
The beneficiary may not recover consequential damages, however. 9
The pattern is instructive. It reveals as the legislature's purposes: (1)
by creating a per se damages rule in the amount of the beneficiary's
dishonored draft, a policy of creating disincentives for the issuer to
dishonor;98 and (2) by fashioning the per se damages rule and by
prohibiting recovery of consequential damages a policy of fostering
certainty in wrongful dishonor litigation. The official comments assert
that given the prohibition of consequential damages "[a] fortioripunitive
and exemplary damages are excluded." 99 Consequential damages and
punitive damages, of course, are notoriously difficult to estimate ex ante.
The remedy section mandates attorney's fees, perhaps as a surrogate for
punitive damages, but one that is less difficult to estimate. 00 In short,
this complex set of rules reflects the same policy limitations that the
economic loss doctrine serves.
Application of tort liability, of course, upsets the certainty feature,
opens the damages in a way that renders them impossible for the issuer
to estimate, and creates an imbalance in the Article's remedy rules. It
also renders problematic banks' compliance with regulations that order
banks to issue letters of credit only if their liability is restricted to an

95. See U.C.C. § 5-111(c) (2002). The interest rule supports the legislature's desire to
ensure that the law does not create an incentive for the issuer to breach. Courts have held
that interest runs from the date of wrongful dishonor until payment. See Data Gen. Corp.
v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776 (D. Conn. 1980); Ddcor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v.
Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied,454 U.S. 1148 (1982); cf U.S. Bank, NA v. BankPlus, No. 09-0784KD-B, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33413 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 5, 2010) (computing interest from
date of presentment without regard for issuer's unsuccessful effort to interplead the letter
of credit proceeds).
96. U.C.C. § 5-111 (b) (2002).
97. Id.
98. "Because the letter of credit depends upon speed and certainty of payment, it is
important that the issuer not be given an incentive to dishonor." U.C.C. § 5-111 cmt. 1
(2002). Note also that the dishonoring issuer may not subrogate itself to its customer's
causes of action. The subrogation rule of Article 5 permits subrogation only if the issuer
honors, not if it dishonors. See U.C.C. § 5-117(a) (2002). The remedies section augments
that disincentive, furthermore, by stipulating that the court must award attorney's fees to
the prevailing beneficiary. See U.C.C. § 5-111(e) (2002).
99. U.C.C. § 5-111 cmt. 4 (2002) (second sentence). The comment adds that punitive
damages under statutory or common law duties "arising outside of' Article 5 are
recoverable. Id.
100. U.C.C. § 5-11 (e) (2002).
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amount certain. 101 The remedies section balances the issuer's protection
against speculative consequential and punitive damages on the one hand
with the beneficiary's protection against the issuer's claim that the
beneficiary should mitigate and the beneficiary's absolute claim for
attorney's fees on the other, all in a manner that appears to be mindful of
regulator's concerns that financial institutions not be open to unlimited
liability.
Claims for negligence,' 02 breach of contract, 03 negligent
fraud,10 6
misrepresentation, 0 5
intentional
misrepresentation,1 04
conversion,107

detrimental

reliance,108

intentional

interference

with

contractual rights,' 09 unjust enrichment,"i 0 conversion,' breach of the
implied covenant of good faith,1 2 tortious and reckless conduct," 3 and
breach of fiduciary dutyll 4-all of which beneficiaries have pleaded in
their suits for wrongful dishonor-upset the legislature's balance and

101. "As a matter of safe and sound banking practice, banks that issue independent
undertakings should not be exposed to undue risk. At a minimum, banks should consider
the following: .... The undertaking should be limited in amount." Comptroller of the
Currency, Dep't of the Treasury, 12 C.F.R. § 7.1016(b)(1)(ii) (2008).
102. Bath Iron Works Corp. v. WESTLB, No. 02 Civ. 2272 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6212, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2004); cf Gen. Cable CEAT, SA v. Futura
Trading, Inc., No. 82 Civ. 1087 (RLC), 1983 WL 1156 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1983).
103. Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S. v. United Cal. Disc. Corp., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1047,
1060 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
104. LaBarge Pipe & Steel Co. v. First Bank, 550 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2008); Indeca,
675 F. Supp. at 1515 (suit against confirmer for recklessness and negligent
misrepresentation).
105. Equal Justice Found. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Am., 61 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(West) 120, No. C2-04-228, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69890, at *19-20 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
27, 2006) (anticipatory dishonor case).
106. Creaciones Con Idea, S.A. de C.V. v. Mashreqbank PSC, 51 F. Supp. 2d 423
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); cf Equal Justice Found. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Am., 412 F. Supp.
2d 790 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (anticipatory dishonor case).
107. Contitrade Servs. Corp. v. Eddie Bauer, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
108. LaBarge Pipe & Steel Co., 550 F.3d at 464.
109. Schmueser v. Burkbumett Bank, 937 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1991); Hubbard Bus.
Plaza v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 344 (D. Nev. 1984), aff'd, 844 F.2d
792 (9th Cir. 1988) (table).
110. Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91170, at *31.
111. RBC Bank (USA) v. Holiday Isle, LLC, No. 09-0038-WS-C, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84307 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2009); Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Concord Bank, 248 F.
Supp. 2d 867 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
112. Fanslow v. N. Trust Co., 700 N.E.2d 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
113. Esso Petroleum Can. v. Sec. Pac. Bank, 710 F. Supp. 275 (D. Or. 1989).
114. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6212.
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certainty. Arguably, there is no room for tort in wrongful dishonor cases
and courts should dismiss those claims." 5
B. Wrongful Advice
The letter of credit industry has taken steps to reduce the incidence
permits banks to communicate
of mistake in advices. SWIFT'
electronically, and most bank advisors send the beneficiary a printed
copy of the electronic credit it receives from the opening bank or the
electronic copy itself. It is not unusual for the applicant's data entry
clerks, using electronic data interchange, to send data to the issuer,
whose entry clerks enter it wholesale into the issuer's software and cause
the credit to issue to the advisor in electronic format. Finally, SWIFT
limits membership and polices its program with various algorithms,
software, and other safety devices that render the identity of senders and
advisors reliable and virtually error free-a vast improvement over
devices the industry used in former times (teletype machines that ran out
of paper or bank signature records that required bankers to act as
handwriting experts comparing signatures on letters of credit)."' 7 An
advisor's duty to the beneficiary and to the issuer is to render the advice
accurately and to the beneficiary to check the apparent authenticity of the
issuer. SWIFT renders the risk of error in either case minimal.
Nonetheless, there can be mistakes." Yet, mistakes other than those
mentioned are not actionable. If, then, an advisor does not advise in
timely fashion, so that the beneficiary does not receive the advice in time
to draw on it, the advisor is not liable.' 9 One might argue simply that the
advisor has no duty to advise in timely fashion or that there is no privity
between the advisor and the beneficiary. The more convincing answer to
advisor non-liability in this setting and others outside the scope of the
duties imposed by Article 5 is that the beneficiary is in the better position
to know the consequences of the tardiness or mistake. In the unlikely
event that an advisor issues a credit with terms or conditions that vary the
terms of the underlying contract, the beneficiary will know of the
mistakes, but the advisor, a stranger to that underlying contract will not.
115. As some courts have in fact done. See sources cited supra note 52.
i16. For discussion of SWIFT, see discussion supra note 7.
117. For discussion of the technology evolution in the issuance and enforcement of
letters of credit in the banking setting, see I DOLAN TREATISE, supra note 50, at 1.03.
118. See AC Monk & Co. v. UBAF Arab Am. Bank, 875 F. Supp. 311 (E.D.N.C.
1995).
119. These are the facts of Sound of Market Street, Inc. v. Cont'l Bank Int'l, 819 F.2d
384, 384 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the advisor was not liable to the beneficiary for late
delivery of the advice).
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Similarly, if advice is late, the beneficiary can take steps to protect itself.
It should not ship goods before it receives the advice. If the advice does
not arrive, it must notify the applicant, and ask whether the credit has
been issued. If the terms of the advice vary from the terms of the
underlying contract, the beneficiary should obtain an amendment before
shipping the goods. Manufacturers should not begin the manufacture of
specialty goods before they know there is a credit in place on which they
can draw. In these cases, the beneficiary knows the critical facts. The
advisor does not. To impose liability on the advisor for these mistakes
flies in the face of the economic loss doctrine's policies.
The possibility of loss to the beneficiary, moreover, from breach of
the advisor's duties under the UCP is unlikely; but losses, if they do arise
out of such breach, should fall on the advisor. The advisor can check the
apparent authenticity of the request from the issuer or can take steps to
ensure that it transmits the advice accurately. The beneficiary, however,
is in the superior position to know facts and to guard against other
mistakes.
Article 5 does not address the issue of damages in the event of
advisor breach.120 The certainty concerns are evident in the issuer
liability rules for wrongful dishonor come into play here. Arguably, it is
more consistent with the policy evident in the remedy section and with
the economic loss doctrine to make the advisor liable for the full amount
of the beneficiary's loss when the issuer dishonors because of the
advisor's mistake. One could use contract damages rules by analogy and
force the beneficiary to prove its losses by a preponderance of the
evidence. That approach guarantees litigation with its attendant costs to
both parties. A per se rule similar to that of section 5-111(a) is the better
answer. The beneficiary's losses here are economic. The per se rule
permits the advisor to estimate its risks. Under a per se rule, damages are
not speculative or difficult to prove, and the beneficiary alone, not its
suppliers, employees, or anyone else can recover.121 The duties run to the
beneficiary alone.
VI. APPLICANT CAUSES OF ACTION
A. For Wrongful Dishonor
When the issuer dishonors wrongfully, it is not only the beneficiary
that incurs losses. The applicant may also incur them. The issuer's
dishonor may render the applicant in breach of the underlying contract.
120. See U.C.C. § 5-111 (2002).
121. Id. § 5-111 (a).
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The "underlying contract" in a commercial letter of credit is, as the
illustration in note five supra indicates,' 22 a contract for the sale of
goods. If that contract specifies "payment by letter of credit," the issuer's
dishonor of the beneficiary's complying presentation renders the
applicant, the buyer of the goods, liable for the sales price. 123 In a
standby credit transaction, payment under the credit may well be an
interest or principal payment on a bond or similar obligation. In both
cases, the applicant may incur damages-loss of goods for which it must
cover in the commercial transaction and acceleration of principal
indebtedness in the standby transaction. Both can lead to consequential
damages-damage to reputation in an industry in the commercial
transaction with attendant refusal of suppliers to deal and embarrassment
or insolvency in the standby transaction.
The Article 5 remedy section stipulates that such a damaged
applicant may recover his damages, including incidental damages, less
expenses saved as a consequence of the breach, but not consequential
damages.124 The breach, of course, is not a breach of the letter of credit
but of the application agreement-a garden variety contract. Thus the
Article 5 rule is puzzling, for, apart from the fee that the applicant paid
the issuer for issuing the credit, consequential damages are really the
only damages the applicant will incur.125 The issuer will not debit the
applicant's account. There will be no payment under the credit and no
corresponding reimbursement obligation. Any fee that the applicant has
paid to the issuer ought to be returned, but that fee will almost always be
small relative to the applicant's consequential losses. The official
comments to the remedies section are unhelpful, and the measure of the
applicant's non-consequential damages remains obscure.1 2 6
It is not obscure, however, that under Article 5 the applicant should
not recover consequential damages.12 7 If a standby credit applicant uses a
standby to make direct payments on a bond, the applicant may sustain
serious consequential damages when the issuer dishonors the standby
wrongfully. The applicant may lose financially attractive credit terms
under the bond. It may have to refinance at higher rates and may incur
penalties, attorney's fees and other expenses due the bondholder. In those
circumstances, however, though the applicant may, under section 5-

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See supra note 5.
See U.C.C. § 2-325(c) (2003).
See U.C.C. § 5-111(b) (2002).
Id.
See U.C.C. § 5-1 11 cmt. 4 (2004).
U.C.C. § 5-111 (2004).
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111(b) recover the fee it paid the issuer, it may not recover the serious
consequential damages.
Application of tort causes of action, for negligent evaluation of the
beneficiary's documents, say, would relieve the harshness of that rule.
Yet application of tort law here violates the Article 5 policy of protecting
financial institutions from liability for the unlimited damages that tort
law countenances. Pre-Article 5 commentary, government regulations,
and case law make it abundantly clear that the policy against imposing
consequential damages on banks is not the product of legislative
indifference or oversight.12 8 Clearly, the applicant's losses are economic,
and application of the economic loss doctrine is in order.
Applicant efforts to recover loss when the issuer wrongfully
dishonors have had limited success. Notwithstanding the clear
implication in section 5-111(b) that applicants may sue for wrongful
dishonor, reported cases involving applicant claims for damages
occasioned by wrongful dishonor are rare. Given the fact that the
applicant is not a party to the letter of credit, courts appear to be
disinclined to sustain such causes of action.129
B. For Wrongful Honor
While applicant claims for wrongful dishonor are not evident in the
cases, applicant claims for wrongful honor arise. These cases, also
sanctioned by Article 5,130 eschew any per se rule, however, that would
allow the applicant to recover the amount of the draw per se. Instead they
force the applicant to prove that the issuer's mistaken payment causes the

128. "If the banks were liable for consequential damages, the added liability would
have to be directly reflected in commercial credit rates, with the result that the skillful
and prudent members of the mercantile community would be paying, through increased
rates, for the ineptitude or recklessness of marginal operators." HENRY HARFIELD, BANK
CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 109 (5th ed. 1974). There is no hint in the pre-code cases that
anything other than the face amount of the credit plus interest are recoverable. See
generally NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
ARTICLE 5-LETTERS OF CREDIT 131-37 (1955). The face-amount rule, moreover, has no
application in the wrongful dishonor setting, for the applicant has not lost that amount,
which should remain in its deposit account, the issuer not having paid the beneficiary.
129. See, e.g., Rival 1981-IV Drilling Program, Ltd. v. Guar. Bank & Trust, 732 P.2d
1233 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Interchemicals Co. v. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l, 635
N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); cf Native Alaskan Reclamation & Pest Control,
Inc. v. United Bank Alaska, 685 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1984) (ambiguous case suggesting
that applicant had standing to sue issuer for wrongful dishonor).
130. See U.C.C. § 5-111(b) (2002).
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applicant loss.' 3 ' Applicants might resort to breach of the application
agreement, a breach of contract action rather than the statutory cause of
action in section 5-111(b), yet for courts to countenance that breach of
contract cause of action with its possibility of consequential damages
clearly violates the plain intention of Article 5 to deny the applicant
recovery of consequential damages. 132
This disparate treatment, (1) a per se rule for beneficiary claims
against issuers for wrongful dishonor and (2) a "damages proved" rule
for applicant claims for wrongful honor or wrongful dishonor, is
consistent with the fact that the former are claims for breach of the letter
of credit undertaking, while the latter are claims for breach of contract,
the application agreement. But, the disparate treatment is inconsistent
with the fact that the issuer is in no better position to foresee damages in
one over the other. Nonetheless, for the purposes of measuring the fit of
the economic loss doctrine in these transactions, both rules support its
application. The per se rule reflects legislative concern that damages not
be unlimited and that litigation over them not be protracted. It is a simple
rule, easy to determine and easy to apply.
The per se rule, though inexact in measuring the beneficiary's actual
damages, allows easy determination of a figure that approximates the
damages the beneficiary suffers. There is no amount in the letter of credit
transaction that approximates the applicant's losses, however, so a per se
rule for applicant claims for wrongful dishonor cannot supply a valid
damages measure. The "damages proved" rule is a breach of contract
damages rule. As a typical contract damages remedy, it applies without
regard for negligence or bad faith; furthermore, it does not allow
recovery of exemplary damages, 1 and the losses it covers are economic
losses.

131. Id. ("[Tihe applicant may recover damages resulting from the breach, including
incidental but not consequential damages, less any amount saved as a result of the
breach.").
132. See id. (emphasis added) ("[I]ncluding incidental but -not consequential
damages[.]").
133. Exemplary damages are typically not recoverable in breach of contract actions.
"No matter how reprehensible the breach, damages are generally limited to those required
to compensate the injured party for lost expectation, for it is a fundamental tenet of the
law of contract remedies that an injured party should not be put in a better position than
had the contract been performed." See E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcrs 760 (4th ed.
2004) (citation omitted). The rule recognizes that the law does not discourage efficient
contract breach and that awards of punitive or exemplary damages undermine that
principle. Id. at 737. The UCC generally denies exemplary damages. See U.C.C. § 1305(a) (2004).
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In short, the stated Article 5 remedies for applicant recovery for
breach of the application agreement are purely economic.13 4 Article 5
limits damages in the same way that the doctrine limits them. There is no
statutory justification, then, to supplement the Article 5 remedies with
tort remedies.
C. For Breach of Warranty
Applicants complain when the beneficiaries' draws on the issuer are
fraudulent, include forged documents, or constitute a breach of the
underlying contract between the applicant and the beneficiary.'3 Thus,
when a beneficiary presents a forged bill of lading; a seriously false, i.e.,
fraudulent,136 inspection certificate; or draws for amounts in exces's of
those due under the contract between the beneficiary and the applicant,
the applicant is necessarily damaged and merits a cause of action against
the beneficiary for losses occasioned by the issuer's payment against
such draws. Although applicants often style these actions in any variety
of ways, these complaints sound in warranty. Section 5-110 creates such
warranties when the issuer pays the beneficiary in such cases. 37
134. See U.C.C. § 5-111(b) (2002).
135. The text does not address multi-party letter of credit transactions that feature an
applicant for the credit that is not in privity with the issuer. Those cases often involve a
corporate cognate or principal of the party for whose account the credit issues. The
cognate or other interested party lends its credit to the account party by applying for the
credit. See, e.g., 5027-Atria Builders, L.L.C. v. Morgan 32 Holdings, L.L.C., 922
N.Y.S.2d 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); One Step Up, Ltd. v. Webster Bus. Credit Corp.,
925 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); In re Valley Vue Joint Venture, 123 BR. 199
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991). Sometimes the account party applies for the credit, and the
cognate or the principal guarantees the account party's reimbursement obligation. See,
e.g., McCaughey v. Bank of Am., N.A., 279 F. App. 794 (11th Cir. 2008). Article 5
anticipates these transactions. See U.C.C. §5-102(a)(2) (2002). First it defines "applicant"
to include both the party in privity with the beneficiary (the account party) and the party
whose credit standing prompts the issuer to issue the credit. Id. Second, in the comments
to the remedy section, the drafters made it clear that the party not in privity benefits from
the warranty. U.C.C. § 5-110 cmt. 2 (2002). The warranty section's application is not
limited to those multi-party transactions as comment 3 to the warranty section makes
clear. Id. at cmt. 3. For thoughtful and comprehensive treatment of this and related
questions under the warranty section, see Richard Dole, Warranties by Beneficiaries of
Letters of Credit Under Revised Article 5 of the UCC: The Truth and Nothing but the
Truth, 39 Hous. L. REv. 375 (2002). See also discussion infra note 148.
136. Fraud in Article 5 does not arise in the event of technical misstatements or the
like. See U.C.C. § 5-109(a) (2002). Article 5 actions are fraudulent only if they are
"materially" fraudulent. Id. Such fraud does not arise when the beneficiary has a
colorable right to draw but only if the draw is "plainly" a violation of the underlying
contract or if the beneficiary has no "colorable" right to draw. See id. at cmt. 1.
137. See U.C.C. § 5-110(a) (2002).
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Regrettably, disappointed applicants, for whatever reasons, are
inclined to fashion causes of action other than the warranty causes,
resorting instead to actions in third-party-contract-beneficiary theory, 38
common-law fraud,' 39 negligent misrepresentation,1 40 breach of contract,
negligence, conversion, and unjust enrichment.141 The breach of
warranty cause of action is sometimes broader than these causes of
action and sometimes narrower. It broadens liability, for example, by
permitting those who are not party to any contract with the beneficiary
but who suffer loss by virtue of the warranty breach to sue, 42 and
reduces the burden of showing a cause of action for common-law fraud.
It narrows liability by rejecting any per se damages rule and forbidding
exemplary damages. A breach of warranty case under the 1965 version
of Article 5 awarded judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount of the
credit-a per se rule, for the actual damages were never proved.143 The
comments to section 5-110 make it clear that the per se rule does not
apply ' and that breach of warranty damages under UCC Articles 2, 3,
and 4 might provide courts with helpful analogies. The comments also

138. E.g., Leica Geosystems, AG v. Jefferson Cnty., 325 F. App. 816 (1lth Cir. 2009)
(applicant claiming to be third party beneficiary of underlying contract and also claiming
for breach of the letter of credit warranty).
139. E.g., Sewchez Int'l Ltd. v. CIT Grp./Commercial Servs., 359 F. App. 722 (9th
Cir. 2009).
140. E.g., Instituto Nacional De Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 530 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
141. For a case in which the applicant claimed against the beneficiary in a wrongful
draw setting for conversion, breach of contract, negligence, and unjust enrichment, see
Krause v. Stroh Brewery Co., 240 F. Supp. 632 (E.D. Mich. 2002). Cf Arrowood Indem.
Co. v. Assurecare Corp., No. 11 CV 5206, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146095 (N.D. 111.Dec.
15, 2011) (suit for breach of contract, conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, and
negligence); Atria Builders, 922 N.Y.S.2d 364 (suit for wrongful draw, styled as one for
conversion or money had and received). For numerous additional cases, see 1 DOLAN
TREATISE, supra note 50, at 6.07[1] n.587.
142. See U.C.C. § 5-110 cmt. 2 (2002). For an illustrative case, see Alstom Power, Inc.
v. RMF Indus. Contracting, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 766 (W.D. Pa. 2006). One plaintiff
ignoring the warranty section was able to recover but only after meeting the heavy burden
of showing that he was an intended third-party beneficiary of the underlying contract. Id.
See also Centennial Mtg., Inc. v. Blumenfeld, 745 N.E.2d 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). For
cases in which the third-party beneficiary argument failed for want of proof, see I DOLAN
TREATISE, supra note 50, 9.02[3], at 9-15 n.79. For one case holding squarely that a
third-party beneficiary may sue on the credit, see Turquoise Props. Gulf, Inc. v.
IberiaBank, No. 09-00272KD-N, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97795 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 8, 2009).
143. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 724 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
The plaintiff in Mellon Bank was the issuer, not the applicant. Id. That distinction is
unimportant, however.
144. See UCC § 5-110 cmt. 3 (2002).
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acknowledge, without apology, that sometimes a beneficiary's breach of
this warranty will yield damages of "zero." 4 5
The references to other articles are helpful. Article 2, the UCC's
Sales article, was the locus for development of the economic loss
doctrine. Generally, the economic loss doctrine denies recovery of such
damages unless they are foreseeable.' 4 6 The warranty sections in Articles
3 and 4, moreover, limit recovery for breach of warranty to actual loss
suffered, not to exceed the amount of the item, plus expenses and
interest.14 7 In short, the warranties of the referenced articles are
consistent with application of the economic loss doctrine in Article 5
warranty litigation. They either adopt the doctrine or fashion loss limits
that reflect the policies of the doctrine identified in Part III above:
keeping loss recovery to damages that are foreseeable.

VII. ISSUER AND THIRD PARTY CAUSES OF ACTION

Issuers, beneficiaries, and applicantsl 4 8 are essential parties to the
letter of credit transaction ab initio.14 9 As the transaction proceeds, other
145. Id.
146. This is the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). For an opinion
that invokes it in the commercial payments setting and rehearses its policy origins, see
Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 U.S. 377
(1982).
147. See U.C.C. §§ 3-416(b), 3-417(b), 4-207(b), and 4-208(b) (2002). Not all cases
observe these limitations, however. In 1/2 Price Checks Cashed v. United Auto. Ins. Co.,
344 S.W.3d 378, 389 (Tex. 2011), the court ruled that an action on an improperly
dishonored check is a suit for breach of a contract and, therefore, that attorney's fees
were recoverable even though Article 3 does not provide for such recovery. In Atria
Builders, 922 N.Y.S.2d 364, the court held that an action by an applicant against the
beneficiary for wrongful dishonor of a letter of credit was an action in contract subject to
contract remedies even though the applicant was not in privity with the beneficiary. To
characterize that action as one for breach of the Article 5 warranty is surely superior
analysis. See authority cited infra note 148.
148. The term "applicant" includes not just the buyer in the illustration set out in note 5
supra, but also parties that arrange the letter of credit for the buyer. See U.C.C. § 5102(a)(2) (2002). Whether guarantors of the applicant's reimbursement obligation have
standing to make claims for issuer misbehavior is a matter, one would think of
assignment law or subrogation. Cf U.C.C. § 5-117 (2002) (Article 5 subrogation section
that does not address subrogation for such guarantors). It is clear that all applicants
benefit from the warranty section, including those who are not in privity with the
beneficiary in the underlying transaction. The official comment makes protection of such
applicants the "primary" purpose of the section. U.C.C. § 5-110 cmt. 2 (2002). See also
In re Texas Commercial Energy, 607 F.3d 153 (5th Cir. 2010) (same). But cf 5027-Atria
Builders, L.L.C., 922 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (looking to the
underlying contract to determine liability rather than invoking the warranty section in an
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parties make their appearance. They are (1) banks other than the issuer or
confirmer and (2) investors, a term that may include banks, all of whom
take an interest in obligations that arise post-issuance. Parts V and VI
address beneficiary and applicant remedies respectively. This Part deals
with issuer claims and those of parties who appear in the transaction after
the credit issues.
A. Banks in Their Various Letter of Credit Transaction Roles
The letter of credit issuer is almost always a bank. 5 0 Issuers file
claims against their customers when the customers breach the application
agreement, usually by failing to reimburse the issuer post-payment or by
failing to provide collateral or funds pre-payment if the application
agreement so provides. These claims rest on contract law, are for
economic losses, and fit neatly into the economic loss doctrine, just as
the applicant's claims against the issuer, discussed in Part VI above, fit
into it. In any event, they are beyond the scope of this paper, which
addresses letter of credit transaction claims, not breach of contract
claims.
The letter of credit issuer does make claims that arise out of the letter
of credit relationships. Those claims are for breach of the letter of credit
warranties described in section 5-110 of the UCC. Regrettably, cases
involving these claims may miscast them as suits for "wrongful draw,"

action brought by an applicant against the beneficiary with whom the applicant was not in
privity).
149. It is possible, though rare, for letter of credit transactions to involve only two
parties. An issuer may cause a letter of credit to issue to itself as beneficiary. See, e.g.,
Nat'l Bank of N. Am. v. Alizio, 482 N.E.2d 907 (N.Y. 1985). An issuer may issue a
credit on its own behalf. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(10) (2002). There is nothing in letter of
credit law to prevent an applicant to cause an issuer to issue a credit to the applicant as
beneficiary, an arrangement that formerly was common as a "traveler's letter of credit."
See, e.g., Ufitec, S.A. v. Trade Bank & Trust Co., 209 N.E.2d 551, 551 (N.Y. 1965).
150. Non-banks may issue letters of credit, but many that do are financial institutions.
Occasionally, a beneficiary will take a credit issued by an industrial firm, mortgage
broker, or the like, which issues the credit for its own account, sometimes with
predictable and untoward results. See Gulf Bank KSC v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd.
(No. 2), 2 Lloyd's L. Rep. 145 (C.A.) (1994) (involving industrial concern that
wrongfully dishonored letter of credit); Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank,
481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973) (involving mortgage broker issuer that became insolvent).
For a case in which the court derided credits issued by the issuer for it own account as
"mere pieces of paper," see Peter Pan Mgmt. Pty. Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Capital Fin.
Corp. (Australia) Pty. Ltd., (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Commercial &
Equity Division, July 5, 2001).
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breach of contract, replevin, conversion, and unjust enrichment,'"5 ' all the
while ignoring the fact that the beneficiary's conduct breaches the Article
5 warranties due the issuer. 152 A more rational approach would limit
claims to breach of warranty by dismissing these various non-Article 5
claims. A fortiori, courts should also dismiss tort claims with the
exception of those claims that involve material fraud, or other intentional
and dishonest conduct.
There is authority that the economic loss doctrine does not displace
actions for fraud and intentional misrepresentation. Fraud is a problem
no less in letter of credit transactions than in other commercial activity,
and it has caught the attention of courts and legislators, who have
fashioned law over more than sixty years to deal with it. Often,
applicants do not want the issuer to pay the beneficiary, and they
sometimes claim the beneficiary's demand for payment is fraudulent.
If the court entertains that defense by investigating the facts, it will delay
payment of the credit pending the outcome of the litigation that
investigation entails. Delay in payment destroys the credit, however, for
it forces the beneficiary to litigate before it is paid and transmutes the
letter of credit (a pay-now, argue-later device) into a bond (an arguenow, pay-later-device).1 54
In virtue of that threat, courts and the UCC have fashioned limits on
the fraud defense. Chief among them, and the limit pertinent to this
discussion, is the feature of letter of credit law that limits fraud defenses
to those that are what the UCC calls "letter of credit" fraud.
The leading case is from a New York trial court, which held that
courts cannot ignore fraud even though fraud claims pose serious threats
151. See, e.g., Krause, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 634 (claims for conversion, breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and negligence but not for breach of
warranty); In re Enron Corp., 59 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(claim for unjust enrichment but not breach of warranty); Alhadeff v. Meridian on
Bainbridge Island, LLC, 185 P.3d 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (common law claims
sounding in contract and tort) (case reversed, however the claims remained the same);
Alhadeff v. Meridian on Bainbridge Island, LLC, 220 P.2d 1214 (Wash. 2009) (en banc).
152. See, e.g., Bank of Joliet v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, N.A.A., No. 96 C 1145, 1997
WL 619875 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1996) (issuer failing to sue for breach of warranty,
relying instead on applicant's assignment of a breach of underlying contract claim);
United Trade Assocs. Ltd. v. Dickens & Matson (USA) Ltd., 848 F. Supp. 751 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (beneficiary's more burdensome suit for common law fraud when breach of
warranty claim would have been appropriate).
153. Letter of credit law treats claims of forgery in one of the documents the
beneficiary presents in the same way that it treats the fraud defense. If reported cases are
any indication, however, applicants seldom raise the forgery defense.
154. See Eakin v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 875 F.2d 114, 116 (7th Cir. 1989)
(characterizing the credit as a pay-now, argue-later device in contrast to an argue-now,
pay-later device).
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to the all-important independence principle of letter of credit law.' 55
After acknowledging the serious threat that the fraud defense poses for
the independence principle, the New York court held, however, that the
court should stop payment only if the fraud is clear and egregiousshipping rubbish instead of valuable merchandise.' 5 6 In addition, by
virtue of the posture of the matter in the New York case, the court faced
a fraud defense argument that was proved.157 Article 5 and letter of credit
case law following the lead of the New York trial court have cabined the
fraud defense by limiting it to cases of forgery or "material" fraud,158

155. Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1941).
156. Id. at 635.
157. Id. at 633. The matter came to the court's attention in Sztejn on a motion to
dismiss, and the court was forced to accept the fraud, being well pleaded, as established.
Id. That feature of the Sztejn case has prompted U.K. courts to state the rule as one that
applies only if the fraud is "established," a significantly high burden for applicants
attempting to stop payment in the U.K. courts. See, e.g., Banco Santander SA v. Banque
Paribas, (2000) All ER (D) 246 (Ct. App. Civ. Div.); Cairn Energy PLC v. Royal Bank of
Scotland, PLC, (2000) ScotSC 325; Balfour Beatty Civil Eng'g v. Technical & Gen.
Guar. Co. Ltd., (1999) 68 ConLR 180 (Ct. App. Civ. Div.). Most fraud issues arise when
the applicant seeks to stop payment under the credit, and the issue before the courts is
whether it is appropriate to grant injunctive relief when the fraud, though well pleaded,
may be a matter of dispute. The fraud exception to the independence principle has
generated a rich body of commentary in the U.S. and elsewhere. See, e.g., Michelle
Kelly-Louw, Selective Legal Aspects ofBank Demand Guarantees(2008) (South Africa),
at
available
Ali
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/l 0500/1350/thesis.pdfsequence=1;
Malek, Jack: Documentary Credits 245-301 (4th ed. 2009) (U.K.); MATTI KURKELA,
LETTERS OF CREDIT AND BANK GUARANTEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 173-210
(2d ed. 2007) (Finland); AGASHA MUGASHA, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT AND BANK
GUARANTEES 136-194 (2003) (Australia); XIANG GAO, THE FRAUD RULE INTHE LAW OF
7.03, 7.04,
LETTERS OF CREDIT (2002) (China); I DOLAN TREATISE, supra note 50, at
11.05 (U.S.). Article 5 addresses the issue in U.C.C. § 5-109 (2002).
158. See U.C.C. § 5-109(a) (2002). There is a rich body of case law making it clear
that technical misstatements in a beneficiary's presentment to an issuer do not constitute
material fraud. Thus, a certification that sums are due, even though the parties are
disputing the amount due, is not fraud. See Philipp Bros., Inc. v. Oil Country Specialists,
Ltd., 787 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1990). Nor, according to some courts, is it fraud for a
beneficiary to draw on a credit for purposes not stated in the credit but agreed to
elsewhere. See W. Va. Housing Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
Rather than a rule allowing technical fraud arguments to interrupt operation of the
independence principle, the purpose of the fraud exception to that principal rule is one of
preventing the beneficiary from taking the proceeds of the credit when the beneficiary
has no colorable right or no basis in fact to the proceeds. For Judge-as he then wasBreyer's collection of colorful court rulings to this effect, see Ground Air Transfer, Inc.
v. Westates Airlines, Inc., 899 F.2d 1269, 1272-73 (1st Cir. 1990). Cf Peter Ellinger,
Fraudin Documentary Credit Transactions, 1981 J. Bus. L. 258, 262 (concluding that
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imposing serious procedural burdens on issuers or applicants seeking to
invoke it,15 9 and by creating a cadre of protected parties against whom it

is no defense. 16 0
This brief summary of the fraud defense sheds light on the subject of
fraud claims. Fraud litigation before the issuer honors the credit is
anathema to the proper functioning of letters of credit as commercial
devices; hence the legislative and judicial resistance to such defenses
except in the narrowest of situations. Clearly, fraud claims should arise
only after the issuer honors the credit, else the issuer could raise its fraud
claim by way of counterclaim and effectively avoid the tethers Article 5
has fashioned to prevent pre-honor litigation of the fraud issue.
Article 5 recognizes post-honor fraud claims.161 In fact, it codifies a
rule for them in the warranty section, which recognizes fraud as a
warranty breach. 162 Article 5 limits damages for such claims to contract
nature damages and acknowledges that sometimes the damages will be
less that the amount of the credit and sometimes zero. 16 3
It is difficult to conceive of clearer evidence that the legislature does
not want fraud claims to include recovery of damages in tort, including
exemplary damages. What is more, the policy of the warranty section
which includes limitations for fraud claims is also evidence of an
intention that parties not be able to avoid easily the limitations on fraud
claims by styling the claims as bad faith, deceit, intentional
misrepresentation, or the like.
In short, this intentional misbehavior by a beneficiary breaches the
warranty. The breach of warranty cause of action should displace the
issuer's common law tort actions against the beneficiary in letter of
credit litigation.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code fashions a
comprehensive scheme for dealing with the areas of dispute that are most
common in letter of credit litigation: claims for wrongful dishonor,
under the U.S. cases, there is fraud only when "the beneficiary acts without any shred of
honest belief in his rights"); U.C.C. § 5-109 cmt. 1 (2002).
159. See U.C.C. § 5-109(b).
160. See U.C.C. § 5-109(a)(1)(i), (ii), (iii) & (iv). See generally Richard Dole, The
Effect of UCP 600 Upon UCC Article 5 with Respect to Negotiation Credits and the
Immunity of Negotiating Banks from Letter of Credit Fraud, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 735
(2008).
161. See U.C.C. § 5-111 (2002).
162. See U.C.C. § 5-110 (2002).
163. See U.C.C. § 5-111 cmt. 2 (2002).
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wrongful honor, breach of warranty, and adviser or nominated bank
misfeasance.
The legitimate ends of that scheme are fourfold: (1) to simplify and
clarify claim resolution and reduce its attendant costs, (2) to promote
prompt resolution of outstanding claims through a short statute of
limitations, (3) to protect financial institutions and other issuers from
liability exceeding the face amount of their undertakings largely by
prohibiting tort causes of action, narrowing the scope of bad-faith claims
to actual dishonesty, and denying recovery of consequential and
exemplary damages, and (4) to discourage frivolous litigation by
mandating an attorney's fees award for the party succeeding, be it the
claimant or the defendant, in such litigation.
The economic loss, gist of the action, and East River doctrines
support the thesis of this article.'6 More important is the fact that the
Uniform Commercial Code's sophisticated allocation of risks and
liabilities supports the commercial viability of letter of credit
undertakings. Those undertakings are the paradigm of commercial
activity, involving underlying contracts and prompt, inevitable payment
against the formalistic presentation of complying documents. The
sophisticated, non-consumer parties that avail themselves of the letter of
credit payment mechanism may protect themselves in their underlying
relationships ex ante. Article 5 does not permit ex post reallocation of
risk in the letter of credit context. Such reallocation through tort or
common law contract causes of action imposes burdens on letters of
credit that are beyond the parties' reasonable expectations and that neuter
this quintessentially commercial device. Litigation is the bane of the
swift, low-priced letter of credit. Article 5 takes account of commercial
realities when it fashions a scheme for the lean resolution of disputes
arising out of letter of credit activity.

164. Cases finding a comprehensive statutory scheme for recovery for breach of an
obligation also support that thesis. See authority cited in text supra note 50.

